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Abstract
Belief revision has been studied mainly with respect to back-
ground logics that are monotonic in character. In this paper
we study belief revision when the underlying logic is non-
monotonic instead—an inherently interesting problem that is
under explored. In particular, we will focus on the revision of
a body of beliefs that is represented as a logic program un-
der the answer set semantics, while the new information is
also similarly represented as a logic program. Our approach
is driven by the observation that unlike in a monotonic set-
ting where, when necessary, consistency in a revised body of
beliefs is maintained by jettisoning some old beliefs, in a non-
monotonic setting consistency can be restored by adding new
beliefs as well. We will define a syntactic revision function
and subsequently provide representation theorem for charac-
terising it.
Introduction
The ability to change one’s beliefs when presented with new
information is crucial for any intelligent agent. In the area
of belief change, substantial effort has been made towards
the understanding and realisation of this process. Tradition-
ally, it is assumed that the agent’s reasoning is governed by a
monotonic logic. For this reason, traditional belief change is
inapplicable when the agent’s reasoning is non-monotonic.
Our goal in this research program is to extend belief base
(Hansson 1999) approaches in belief revision to nonmono-
tonic setting. In this paper, we focus on disjunctive logic pro-
grams, as a well-studied and well-known approach to non-
monotonic reasoning that also has efficient implementations.
Much, if not most, of our day-to-day reasoning involves
non-monotonic reasoning. To illustrate issues that may arise,
consider the following example. In a university, professors
generally teach, unless they have an administrative appoint-
ment. Assume we know that John is a professor. Since most
faculty do not have an administrative appointment, and there
is no evidence that John does, we conclude that he teaches.
This reasoning is a classical form of non-monotonic reason-
ing, namely using the closed world assumption. It can be
represented by the following logic program under the an-
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swer set semantics.
Teach(X)← Prof(X), not Admin(X). (1)
Prof(John) ← . (2)
The answer set {Prof(John), T each(John)} for this
logic program corresponds exactly to the facts we can con-
clude.
Suppose we receive information that John does not teach,
which we can represent by the rule
← Teach(John). (3)
Now our beliefs about John are contradictory; and it is not
surprising that the logic program consisting of rules (1) – (3)
has no answer set. For us or any intelligent agent in this sit-
uation to function properly, we need a mechanism to resolve
this inconsistency. This is a typical belief revision problem;
however, the classical (AGM) approach can not be applied,
as we are reasoning non-monotonically.
It is not hard to suggest possible causes of the inconsis-
tency and to resolve it. It could be that some of our beliefs
are wrong; perhaps professors with administrative duties
may still need to do teaching or perhaps John is not a profes-
sor. Thus we can restore consistency by removing rule (1) or
(2). Alternatively and perhaps more interestingly, it could be
that assuming that John is not an administrative staff via the
absence of evidence is too adventurous; that is he may in-
deed be an administrative staff member but we don’t know
it. Thus we can also restore consistency by adding the miss-
ing evidence of John being an administrative staff member
by
Admin(John) ← . (4)
The second alternative highlights the distinction for belief
revision in monotonic and non-monotonic settings. In the
monotonic setting, an inconsistent body of knowledge will
remain inconsistent no matter how much extra information
is supplied. On the other hand, in the non-monotonic set-
ting, inconsistency can be resolved by either removing old
information, or adding new information, or both. Therefore,
belief revision functions in a non-monotonic setting should
allow a mixture of removal and addition of information for
inconsistency-resolution. In this paper, we will define one
such revision functions for disjunctive logic programs under
the answer set semantics.
The revision function is called slp-revision and is a be-
lief base revision which takes syntactic information into ac-
count. In revising P by Q, an slp-revision function first ob-
tains a logic programR that is consistent with Q and differs
minimally from P , then combines R with Q. For example,
if P = {(1), (2)} and Q = {(3)}, then R could be {(1)}
(i.e., resolving inconsistency by removing (2)); {(2)} (i.e.,
resolving inconsistency by removing (1)); or {(1), (2), (4)}
(i.e., resolving inconsistency by adding (4)).
The next section gives logical preliminaries. The follow-
ing one develop our approach to slp-revision in which we
provide postulates, a semantic construction, and a represen-
tation result. This is followed by a comparison to other work,
and a brief conclusion.
Preliminary Considerations
In this paper, we consider only fully grounded disjunctive
logic programs. That is variables in program rules are re-
placed by the set of their ground instances. Thus a logic pro-
gram (or program for short) here is a finite set of rules of the
form:
a1; . . . ; am ← b1, . . . , bn, not c1, . . . , not co
where m,n, o ≥ 0, m+n+ o > 0, and ai, bj , ck ∈ A forA
a finite set of propositional atoms. Connective not is called
default negation. We denote the set of all logic programs
by P . For each rule r, let H(r) = {a1, . . . , an}, B+(r) =
{b1, . . . , bm}, and B−(r) = {c1, . . . , co}. The letters P and
Q are used to denote a logic program throughout the paper.
An interpretation is represented by the subset of atoms in
A that are true in the interpretation. A classical model of a
program P is an interpretation in which all rules of P are
true according to the standard definition of truth in propo-
sitional logic, and where default negation is treated as clas-
sical negation. The set of classical models of P is denoted
as Mod(P ). Given an interpretation Y , we write Y |= P to
mean Y is a classical model of P . The reduct of a program
P with respect to an interpretation Y , denoted P Y , is the set
of rules:
{H(r) ← B+(r) | r ∈ P,B−(r) ∩ Y = ∅}.
An answer set Y of P is a subset-minimal classical model
of P Y . The set of all answer set of P is denoted as AS(P ).
An SE interpretation (Turner 2003) is a pair (X,Y ) of
interpretations such that X ⊆ Y ⊆ A. The set of all SE in-
terpretations (over A) is denoted SE . The letters M and N
are used to denote a set of SE interpretations throughout the
paper. An SE interpretation is an SE model of a programP if
Y |= P and X |= P Y . The set of all SE models of P is de-
noted as SE(P ). SE models are proposed to capture strong
equivalence (Lifschitz et al. 2001) between programs that is
SE(P ) = SE(Q) iff P and Q are strongly equivalent, thus
they contain more informations than answer sets.
The following two properties of SE models (Turner 2003)
are crucial to this paper:
1. Y ∈ AS(P ) iff (Y, Y ) ∈ SE(P ) and there is no
(X,Y ) ∈ SE(P ) such that X ⊂ Y .
2. (Y, Y ) ∈ SE(P ) iff Y ∈Mod(P ).
So SE(P ) 6= ∅ iff Mod(P ) 6= ∅ but SE(P ) 6= ∅ does
not imply AS(P ) 6= ∅. This gives rise to two notions of
consistency.
Definition 1. P is consistent iff AS(P ) 6= ∅ and P is m-
consistent1 iff SE(P ) 6= ∅.
It is clear from the SE model properties that consistency im-
plies m-consistency; m-inconsistency implies inconsistency.
In other words, a consistent program is m-consistent but not
vice versa.
In subsequent sections, we will need to describe the dif-
ference between two logic programs. For this purpose, we
use the symmetric difference operator ⊖ which is defined as
X ⊖ Y = (X \ Y ) ∪ (Y \X)
for any sets X and Y .
SLP-Revision Functions
In this section, we give a syntax-based revision function
∗ : P × P 7→ P for revising one logic program by an-
other. The function takes a logic program P called the orig-
inal logic program and a logic program Q called the re-
vising logic program, and returns another logic program
P ∗ Q called the revised logic program. Following AGM
belief revision, we want to have Q contained in P ∗Q (i.e.,
Q ⊆ P ∗Q), P ∗Q is consistent whenever possible, and that
as much of P as consistently possible is contained in P ∗Q.
Clearly, a key issue in defining ∗ is to deal with the pos-
sible inconsistency between Q and P . As illustrated in the
teaching example, one means of ensuring that P ∗Q is con-
sistent is to remove a minimal set of beliefs from P so that
adding Q to the result is consistent. Of course there may
be more than one way to remove beliefs from P . Following
this intuition, we obtain all maximal subsets of P that are
consistent with Q, which we call the s-removal compatible
programs of P with respect to Q.
Definition 2. The set of s-removal compatible programs of
P with respect toQ, denotedP ↓ Q, is such thatR ∈ P ↓ Q
iff
1. R ⊆ P ,
2. R ∪Q is consistent, and
3. if R ⊂ R′ ⊆ P , then R′ ∪Q is inconsistent.
The notion of s-removal compatible programs is not
new, classical revision functions (Alchourro´n et al. 1985;
Hansson 1993) are based on more or less the same notion.
The difference is that this notion alone is sufficient to cap-
ture the inconsistency-resolution strategy of classical belief
revision, but there is more that one can do in non-monotonic
belief revision.
In our non-monotonic setting, we are able to express as-
sumptions (i.e., negation as failure) and to reason with them.
Earlier, we assumed John is not an administrator, in the ab-
sence of evidence to the contrary. With this, we came to the
conclusion that he has to teach. Consequently, if we learn
1
“m” stands for “monotonic” which indicates that the notion of
m-consistency is based on a monotonic characterisation (i.e., SE
models) for logic programs.
that John does not teach, as in our example, one way of re-
solving this inconsistency is by adding information so that
our assumption does not hold. Following this intuition, we
obtain all the minimal supersets of P that are consistent with
Q, which we call the s-expansion compatible program of P
with respect to Q.
Definition 3. The set of s-expansion compatible programs
of P with respect to Q, denoted P ↑ Q, is such that R ∈
P ↑ Q iff
1. P ⊆ R,
2. R ∪Q is consistent, and
3. if P ⊆ R′ ⊂ R, then R′ ∪Q is inconsistent.
Since the s-expansion and s-removal compatible pro-
grams are consistent with Q and are obtained by removing
or adding minimal sets of rules from or to P , the union of
Q with any of these sets is consistent and comprises a least
change made to P in order to achieve consistency. These
programs clearly should be candidates for forming the re-
vised logic program P ∗ Q; however, they do not form the
set of all candidates. In particular, we can obtain a program
that differs the least from P and is consistent with Q by re-
moving some beliefs of P and at the same time adding some
new beliefs to P . Thus we consider all those logic programs
that differ the least from P and are consistent with Q; these
are called the s-compatible programs of P with respect to
Q.
Definition 4. The set of s-compatible programs of P with
respect to Q, denoted P l Q, is such that R ∈ P l Q iff
1. R ∪Q is consistent and
2. if P ⊖R′ ⊂ P ⊖R, then R′ ∪Q is inconsistent.
For example, let P = {a← b, not c., b., e← f, not g., f.}
and Q = {← a.,← e.}. Then P ∪ Q is inconsistent since
a and e can be concluded from P but they contradict the
rules of Q. To resolve the inconsistency via making the least
change to P , we could remove b ← from P (which elimi-
nates the contradiction about a) and add g ← to P (which
eliminates the contradiction about e). The program thus ob-
tained (i.e., (P \ {b.}) ∪ {g.}) is a s-compatible program in
P l Q.
It is obvious, but worth noting that the notion of s-
compatible program subsumes those of s-removal and s-
expansion compatible programs. In the above example, P l
Q also contains P \ {b., f.} and P ∪ {c., g.}, which are re-
spectively an s-removal and an s-expansion compatible pro-
gram of P with respect to Q.
Proposition 1. (P ↑ Q) ∪ (P ↓ Q) ⊆ P l Q.
There are cases in which we cannot resolve inconsis-
tency by only adding new beliefs which means the set of
s-expansion compatible programs is empty. For example, if
P = {a.} and Q = {← a.}, then P ∪ Q is inconsistent
and we cannot restore consistency without removing a ←
from P . In these cases, the inconsistency is due to contradic-
tory facts that can be concluded without using any reasoning
power beyond that of classical logic. Clearly, the inconsis-
tency is of a monotonic nature, that is, in our terminology,
m-inconsistency.
Proposition 2. If P ∪Q is m-inconsistent, then P ↑ Q = ∅.
So far, we have identified the candidates for forming
P ∗ Q. It remains to pick the “best” one. Such extralogi-
cal information is typically modelled by a selection function,
which we do next.
Definition 5. A function γ is a selection function for P iff
for any program Q, γ(P l Q) returns a single element of
P l Q whenever P l Q is non-empty; otherwise it returns
P .
The revised logic program P ∗Q is then formed by combin-
ingQwith the s-compatible program picked by the selection
function for P . We call the function ∗ defined in this way a
slp-revision function for P .
Definition 6. A function ∗ is a slp-revision function for P iff
P ∗Q = γ(P l Q) ∪Q
for any program Q, where γ is a selection function for P .
In classical belief revision, multiple candidates maybe
chosen by a selection function, and their intersection is com-
bined with the new belief to form the revision result. There,
a selection function that picks out a single element is called
a maxichoice function (Alchourro´n et al. 1985). In classical
logic, maxichoice selection functions leads to undesirable
properties for belief set revision but not for belief base re-
vision. In our non-monotonic setting, picking multiple can-
didates does not make sense, as intersection of s-compatible
programs may not be consistent with the revising program.
For example, let P = {a← not b, not c.} andQ = {← a.}.
We can restore consistency of P with Q by, for instance,
adding the rule b ← to P which corresponds to the s-
compatible program P ∪ {b.} or by adding the rule c ←
which corresponds to the s-compatible program P ∪ {c.}.
However, the intersection of the two s-compatible programs
is inconsistent with Q.
We turn next to properties of slp-revision functions. Con-
sider the following set of postulates where ∗ : P × P 7→ P
is a function.
(s∗s) Q ⊆ P ∗Q
(s∗c) If Q is m-consistent, then P ∗Q is consistent
(s∗f) If Q is m-inconsistent, then P ∗Q = P ∪Q
(s∗rr) If R 6= ∅ and R ⊆ P \ (P ∗Q), then
(P ∗Q) ∪R is inconsistent
(s∗er) If E 6= ∅ and E ⊆ (P ∗Q) \ (P ∪Q), then
(P ∗Q) \ E is inconsistent
(s∗mr) If R 6= ∅, R ⊆ P \ (P ∗Q),
E 6= ∅ and E ⊆ (P ∗Q) \ (P ∪Q), then
((P ∗Q) ∪R) \ E is inconsistent
(s∗u) If P l Q = P l R, then
P \ (P ∗Q) = P \ (P ∗R) and
(P ∗Q) \ (P ∪Q) = (P ∗R) \ (P ∪R)
(s∗s) (Success) states that a revision is always successful
in incorporating the new beliefs. (s∗c) (Consistency) states
that a revision ensures consistency of the revised logic pro-
gram whenever possible. In the monotonic setting, a revi-
sion results in inconsistency only when the new beliefs are
themselves inconsistent. This is not the case in the non-
monotonic setting. For example, consider the revision of
P = {a.} by Q = {b ← not b}. Although Q is incon-
sistent, we have P ∪ {b.} as a s-compatible program of P
with respect to Q. Thus we can have P ∪ {b.} ∪ Q as the
revised logic program, which contains Q and is consistent.
Here, a revision results in inconsistency only when the re-
vising logic program is m-inconsistent. In such a case, (s∗f)
(Failure) states that the revision corresponds to the union of
the original and revising logic program.
(s∗rr) (Removal Relevance) states that if some rules are
removed from the original logic program for the revision,
then adding them to the revised logic program results in in-
consistency. It captures the intuition that nothing is removed
unless its removal contributes to making the revised logic
program consistent. (s∗er) (Expansion Relevance) states that
if some new rules other than those in the revising logic pro-
gram are added to the original logic program for the revi-
sion, then removing them from the revised logic program
causes inconsistency. It captures the intuition that nothing
is added unless adding it contributes to making the revised
logic program consistent. (s∗mr) (Mixed Relevance) states
that if some rules are removed from the original logic pro-
gram and some new rules other than those in the revising
logic program are added to the original logic program for the
revision, then adding back the removed ones and removing
the added ones result in inconsistency of the revised logic
program. Its intuition is a mixture of the two above. Note
that putting (s∗rr) and (s∗er) together does not guarantee
(s∗mr), nor the reverse. In summary, these three postulates
express the necessity of adding and/or removing certain be-
lief for resolving inconsistency and hence to accomplish a
revision. In classical belief revision, inconsistency can only
be resolved by removing old beliefs; the necessity of remov-
ing particular beliefs is captured by the Relevance postulate
(Hansson 1993).2 The three postulates are the counterparts
of Relevance in our non-monotonic setting, and we need all
three of them to deal respectively with addition, removal,
and a mixture of addition and removal.
Finally, (s∗u) (Uniformity) states the condition under
which two revising logic programsQ andR trigger the same
changes to the original logic programP . That is the rules re-
moved from P (i.e., P \ (P ∗Q)) and the rules added to P
(i.e., (P ∗Q) \ (P ∪Q)) for accommodatingQ are identical
to those for accommodatingR. Certainly havingQ andR be
strongly equivalent (i.e., SE(Q) = SE(R)) is a sufficient
condition. However, it is too strong a requirement. Suppose
P = {← a.}, Q = {a.}, and R = {a ← b., b.}. Then the
minimal change to P we have to made to accommodate Q
and R are the same, that is we remove ← a. However Q
and R are not strongly equivalent, even though they incur
the same change to P . The essential point of this example is
that instead of a global condition like strong equivalence, we
need a condition that is local to the original logic program
P . Unfortunately, it seems there is no existing notion in the
logic programming literature that captures this local condi-
tion. Thus we use our newly defined notion of s-compatible
programs and come up with the local but more appropriate
condition in (s∗u).
2If ψ ∈ K and ψ 6∈ K ∗ φ, then there is some K′ such that
K ∗ φ ⊆ K′ ⊆ K ∪ {φ}, K′ is consistent but K′ ∪ {ψ} is
inconsistent.
We can show that these postulates are sufficient to char-
acterise all slp-revision functions.
Theorem 1. A function ∗ is a slp-revision function iff it sat-
isfies (s∗s), (s∗c), (s∗f), (s∗rr), (s∗er), (s∗mr), and (s∗u).
Comparisons with Existing Approaches
There has been much work on belief revision for logic pro-
grams. The seminal work of Delgrande et al (2013b) gen-
eralises Satoh’s (1988) and Dalal’s (1988) revision opera-
tors to logic programs. Significantly, they bring SE model
into the picture. They do not work with answer sets as a
basis for revision, but rather they base their definitions di-
rectly on SE models. The work has inspired several other
SE model approaches. Schwind and Inoue (2013) provide
a constructive characterisation for the revision operators in
(Delgrande et al. 2013b). Delgrande et al (2013a) adapt the
model-based revision of Katsuno and Mendelzon (1992) to
logic programs and provide a representation theorem. Fi-
nally, Binnewies et al (2015) provide a variant of partial
meet revision and contraction for logic programs.
Firstly, the SE model approaches are essentially belief
set revision whereas our slp-revision is a belief base one.
Secondly and more importantly, these approaches assume a
weaker notion of consistency, that is m-consistency. For this
reason, some contradictions will not be dealt with in these
approaches. For instance, the contradictory rule a ← not a
is m-consistent thus is considered to be an acceptable state
of belief. Also in our teaching example, as the program con-
sisting of rules (1) – (3) is m-consistent, no attempt will be
made to resolve the contradiction about John’s teaching duty
by the SE model approaches. Therefore for application sce-
narios in which such contradictions can not be tolerant, our
llp-revision function is clearly a better choice.
Apart from the SE model approaches, Kru¨mpelmann
and Kern-Isberner (2012) provide a revision function for
logic programs that originates from Hansson’s semi-revision
(Hansson 1997). Since they assume the same notion of con-
sistency as ours, all the above mentioned contradictions will
be resolved in their approach.
As we have noted, classical belief revision is de-
fined for monotonic setting, not for non-monotonic
ones. Inconsistency can be caused by wrong assump-
tions in the non-monotonic setting but not in the
monotonic setting. Such causes are not considered
in (Kru¨mpelmann and Kern-Isberner 2012). Consequently,
their approach only support one of the many possi-
ble inconsistency-resolution strategies we have developed.
Specifically, in (Kru¨mpelmann and Kern-Isberner 2012), in-
consistency can be resolved only by removing old beliefs;
this strategy is captured by a notion analogous to s-removal
compatible programs. The inconsistency-resolution strate-
gies captured by the notion of s-expansion compatible pro-
gram and s-compatible program in general are not consid-
ered.
Conclusion and Future Work
Depending on the application scenario, the logic govern-
ing an agent’s beliefs could be either monotonic or non-
monotonic. Traditional belief revision assumes that an agent
reasons monotonically; therefore, by definition, it is applica-
ble to such situations only. Here we have aimed to provide a
belief revision framework for situations in which the agent
reasons non-monotonically. To this end, we defined a belief
revision function for disjunctive logic programs under the
answer set semantics.
Inconsistency-resolution is an essential task for belief re-
vision. However, the strategies used in traditional belief re-
vision functions are limited to situations when the agent rea-
sons monotonically. With a logic program we have the lux-
ury of making assumptions via lack of contrary evidence,
and we can deduce certain facts from such assumptions.
Thus if a set of beliefs is inconsistent, then one possible
cause is that we made the wrong assumption. In such cases,
we can resolve the inconsistency by adding some new rules
so that the assumption can no longer be made. Such a cause
of inconsistency and the associated inconsistency-resolution
strategy is beyond the scope of traditional belief revision, but
is crucial for non-monotonic belief revision. We argue that
this rationale, which is encoded in our belief revision func-
tion, captures the fundamental difference between mono-
tonic and non-monotonic belief revision.
This paper then has explored belief base revision in the
non-monotonic setting of disjunctive logic programs. Note
that the characterising postulates of the base revision are for-
mulated in terms of set-theoretic notions (e.g., subsets, set
differences); the only logical notion required is consistency.
Moreover the key idea, namely the notion of s-compatible
programs, is also based on the same set-theoretic and logi-
cal notions. These notions are present in all non-monotonic
settings. In future work we propose to extend the base re-
vision to a general approach to belief revision in arbitrary
non-monotonic settings.
Appendix: Proof of Results
In this appendix, we give the proof for the main results.
Proof for Proposition 2
Let P and Q are logic programs. Suppose P ∪ Q is m-
inconsistent. We need to show P ↑ Q = ∅.
Since P ∪ Q is m-inconsistent, we have SE(P ) ∩
SE(Q) = ∅. By the definition of s-expansion compatible
program, any element in P ↑ Q has to be a superset of P
and consistent with Q. However, for any superset R of P ,
we have SE(R) ⊆ SE(P ). Thus SE(R) ∩ SE(Q) = ∅
which implies R ∪Q is m-inconsistent.
Proof for Theorem 1
For one direction, suppose ∗ is a slp-revision function
for P and the associated selection function is γ. We need
to show ∗ satisfies (s∗s), (s∗c), (s∗f), (s∗rr), (s∗er), (s∗mr),
and (s∗u). (s∗s), (s∗c), and (s∗f) follow immediately from
the definition of slp-revision functions and compatible pro-
grams.
(s∗rr): Suppose there is a set R such that R 6= ∅ and R ⊆
P \ (P ∗Q). By the definition of slp-revision, we have P ∗
Q = γ(P l Q) ∪Q, hence P \ (γ(P l Q) ∪Q) 6= ∅ which
implies γ(P l Q) 6= P . Then it follows from the definition
of selection function that P l Q 6= ∅ and γ(P l Q) ∈ P l
Q. Let γ(P l Q) = X . Then (P ∗Q)∪R = X∪Q∪R. Since
∅ 6= R ⊆ P , we have ((X ∪ R) ⊖ P ) ⊂ (X ⊖ P ). By the
definition of compatible program,X ∪R∪Q is inconsistent
that is (P ∗Q) ∪R is inconsistent.
(s∗er): Suppose there is a set E such that E 6= ∅ and
E ⊆ (P ∗ Q) \ (P ∪ Q). By the definition of slp-revision,
we have P ∗ Q = γ(P l Q) ∪ Q, hence (γ(P l Q) ∪
Q) \ (P ∪ Q) 6= ∅ which implies γ(P l Q) 6= P . Then
it follows from the definition of selection function that P l
Q 6= ∅ and γ(P l Q) ∈ P l Q. Let γ(P l Q) = X . Then
(P ∗Q)\E = (X∪Q)\E. SinceE∩P = ∅ and ∅ 6= E ⊆ X ,
((X \E)⊖P ) ⊂ (X ⊖P ). By the definition of compatible
program, (X \E)∪Q is inconsistent. Then sinceE∩Q = ∅,
we have (X \E)∪Q = (X ∪Q) \E = (P ∗Q) \E. Thus
(P ∗Q) \ E is inconsistent.
(s∗mr): Can be proved by combining the proving method
for (s∗rr) and (s∗er).
(s∗u): Suppose P l Q = P l R. Then γ(P l Q) =
γ(P l R). If P l Q = P l R = ∅, then by the definition
of slp-revision P ∗Q = P ∪ Q and P ∗ R = P ∪ R. Thus
P \ (P ∗Q) = P \ (P ∗R) = ∅ and (P ∗Q) \ (P ∪Q) =
(P ∗ R) \ (P ∪ R) = ∅. So suppose P l Q = P l R 6= ∅
and let X = γ(P l Q) = γ(P l R). By the definition of
slp-revision, we have P \ (P ∗Q) = P \ (X ∪Q). Assume
∅ 6= P ∩Q 6⊆ X . Then since X ∪ (P ∩Q) is consistent with
Q and (X ∪ (P ∩Q))⊖P ⊂ X ⊖P , X is not a compatible
program, a contradiction! Thus P ∩ Q = ∅ or P ∩Q ⊆ X .
In either case we have by set theory that P \ (P ∗ Q) =
P \ (X ∪Q) = P \X . It can be shown in the same manner
thatP \(P ∗R) = P \(X∪R) = P \X . ThusP \(P ∗Q) =
P \ (P ∗R). Again by the definition of slp-revision, we have
(P ∗Q)\ (P ∪Q) = (X ∪Q)\ (P ∪Q) = X \P . Similarly
(P ∗ R) \ (P ∪ R) = (X ∪ R) \ (P ∪ R) = X \ P . Thus
(P ∗Q) \ (P ∪Q) = (P ∗R) \ (P ∪R).
For the other direction, suppose ∗ is a function that satis-
fies (s∗s), (s∗c), (s∗f), (s∗rr), (s∗er), (s∗mr), and (s∗u). We
need to show ∗ is a slp-revision function.
Let γ be defined as:
γ(P l Q) = ((P ∗Q) ∩ P ) ∪ ((P ∗Q) \Q)
for all Q. It suffices to show γ is a selection function for P
and P ∗Q = γ(P l Q) ∪Q.
Part 1: For γ to be a selection function, it must be a
function. Suppose P l Q = P l R. Then (s∗u) implies
P \ (P ∗ Q) = P \ (P ∗ R) and (P ∗ Q) \ (P ∪ Q) =
(P ∗R)\(P∪R). Since P = (P \(P ∗Q))∪((P ∗Q)∩P ) =
(P \(P ∗R))∪((P ∗R)∩P ), P \(P ∗Q) = P \(P ∗R) im-
plies (P ∗Q)∩P = (P ∗R)∩P . Thus (P ∗Q)\ (P ∪Q) =
(P ∗ R) \ (P ∪ R) implies ((P ∗ Q) ∩ P ) ∪ ((P ∗ Q) \
(P ∪ Q)) = ((P ∗ R) ∩ P ) ∪ ((P ∗ R) \ (P ∪ R)). Then
by set theory, we have ((P ∗ Q) ∩ P ) ∪ ((P ∗ Q) \ Q) =
((P ∗R) ∩ P ) ∪ ((P ∗R) \R). Finally, it follows from the
definition of γ that γ(P l Q) = γ(P l R).
If P l Q = ∅, then we have to show γ(P l Q) = P .
P l Q = ∅ implies Q is m-inconsistent, hence it follows
from (s∗f) that P ∗ Q = P ∪ Q. Then by the definition
of γ, γ(P l Q) = ((P ∗ Q) ∩ P ) ∪ ((P ∗ Q) \ Q) =
((P ∪Q) ∩ P ) ∪ ((P ∪Q) \Q) = P .
If P l Q 6= ∅, then we have to show γ(P l Q) ∈ P l Q.
Since P l Q 6= ∅, Q is m-consistent. Then (s∗c) implies
P ∗Q is consistent. Since γ(P l Q)∪Q = ((P ∗Q)∩P )∪
((P ∗ Q) \ Q) ∪ Q = P ∗ Q, γ(P l Q) ∪ Q is consistent.
Assume there is X s.t. X ∪ Q is consistent and X ⊖ P ⊂
γ(P l Q)⊖ P . Then we have three cases:
Case 1, there is R s.t. ∅ 6= R ⊆ P \ γ(P l Q), and
X = γ(P l Q) ∪ R: If R ∩ Q = ∅, then since γ(P l
Q)∪Q = P ∗Q,R∩(P ∗Q) = ∅. Then it follows from (s∗rr)
that (P ∗Q)∪R is inconsistent. Since X∪Q = (P ∗Q)∪R,
X ∪ Q is inconsistent, a contradiction! If R ∩ Q 6= ∅, then
since R ⊆ P , R ∩ P ∩ Q 6= ∅. Since (s∗s) implies Q ⊆
P ∗ Q, we have Q ∩ P ⊆ (P ∗ Q) ∩ P , which implies
R∩((P∗Q)∩P ) 6= ∅. Then since ((P∗Q)∩P ) ⊆ γ(P l Q),
γ(P l Q) ∩ R 6= ∅, a contradiction! Thus R ∩ Q 6= ∅ is an
impossible case.
Case 2, there is E s.t. E ∩ P = ∅, ∅ 6= E ⊆ γ(P l Q),
andX = γ(P l Q)\E: ThenE ⊆ γ(P l Q)∪Q = P ∗Q.
IfE∩Q = ∅, then (s∗er) implies (P ∗Q)\E is inconsistent.
Since X ∪Q = γ(P l Q) \ E ∪Q = (P ∗Q) \ E, X ∪Q
is inconsistent, a contradiction! If E ∩ Q 6= ∅, then E 6⊆
(P ∗Q)\Q. SinceE∩P = ∅, we haveE∩(P ∗Q)∩P = ∅.
Thus E 6⊆ ((P ∗Q) ∩ P ) ∪ ((P ∗Q) \Q) = γ(P l Q), a
contradiction! Thus E ∩Q 6= ∅ is an impossible case.
Case 3, there are R and E s.t. ∅ 6= R ⊆ P , R ∩ γ(P l
Q) = ∅, E ∩ P = ∅, ∅ 6= E ⊆ γ(P l Q), and X = (γ(P l
Q) ∪ R) \ E: Then we can show as in Case 1 and 2 that
R∩P ∗Q = ∅ andE ⊆ P ∗Q. IfR∩Q = ∅ andE∩Q = ∅,
then (s∗mr) implies ((P ∗Q)∪R) \E is inconsistent. Thus
X ∪Q = ((γ(P l Q)∪R)\E)∪Q = ((P ∗Q)∪R)\E is
inconsistent, a contradiction! Also we can show as in Case
1 and 2 that that R ∩ Q = ∅ and E ∩ Q = ∅ are impossible
cases.
Part 2: By set theory, γ(P l Q) ∪Q = ((P ∗Q) ∩ P ) ∪
((P ∗Q) \Q) ∪Q = ((P ∗Q) ∩ P ) ∪ (P ∗Q) = P ∗Q.
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